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SPECIAL REPORT
Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply to Zelinsky
by Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason
In the November 13, 2017, issue of State Tax 
Notes,1 professor Edward Zelinsky disagreed with 
our conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Wynne makes clear that New York’s 
tax residence rule unconstitutionally violates the 
dormant commerce clause. The dormant 
commerce clause forbids state tax rules that 
discriminate against cross-border commerce, 
which, as the Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged, occurs when state tax rules 
discourage cross-border commerce relative to in-
state commerce.
Zelinsky objects that Wynne is enigmatic 
because “its central conclusion — that tarifflike 
state tax polices discriminate for dormant 
commerce clause purposes — has no discernable 
limit.” But the Supreme Court has confirmed that 
we can ferret out income taxes that function as 
tariffs via the easy-to-apply internal consistency 
test.2 We have explained in other work both the 
connection between the internal consistency test 
and tariffs and how the internal consistency test 
can be applied to identify discriminatory tax 
policies.3
Tax rules violate the internal consistency test 
when, if imposed by every state, they would lead 
inevitably to double taxation. One of the 
advantages of the internal consistency test is that 
it allows a court to determine the constitutionality 
of a state tax by looking at that state’s tax rules in 
isolation. It is not necessary for a court to consider 
how New York’s state tax laws interact with New 
Jersey’s — or Wyoming’s — state tax laws.
Michael S. Knoll is the Theodore Warner 
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, professor of real estate at the 
Wharton School, and co-director of the Center 
for Tax Law and Policy at University of 
Pennsylvania. Ruth Mason is Class of 1957 
Research Professor of Law at the University of 
Virginia School of Law. Mason served as an 
expert for taxpayers in cases implicating the 
issues discussed in this article. Publishing an 
article was not contemplated as part, nor a 
condition, of that representation. She has no 
pending financial stake in the outcomes of those 
cases.
In this report, the authors respond to an 
article by professor Edward Zelinsky that 
recently appeared in State Tax Notes.




Edward A. Zelinsky, “Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to 
Knoll and Mason,” State Tax Notes, Nov. 13, 2017, p. 677.
2
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
3
See Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason, “The Economic Foundation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause,” 103 Va. L. Rev. 309 (2017). We have 
sympathy for the other points Zelinsky makes — including that there is 
no compelling reason to treat subsidies differently from taxes under the 
dormant commerce clause. Although the different legal treatments of 
discriminatory taxes and discriminatory subsidies may not be satisfying 
intellectually, we disagree that it makes the dormant commerce clause 
limitless.
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For the reasons we explained earlier, New 
York’s residence rules are internally inconsistent.4 
If all 50 states adopted New York’s tax residence 
rules, dual residents would always be double-
taxed on their income from intangibles.5 As a 
result, under the reasoning of Wynne, New York 
has a constitutional problem.
Moreover, the Wynne ruling is neither 
incoherent nor as broad as Zelinsky suggests. 
Zelinsky gives the example of Maryland reducing 
its personal income tax rate, which, as he points 
out, would encourage Maryland residents to 
retain more of their money at home (to take 
advantage of the reduced tax rate). According to 
Zelinsky, the Maryland rate reduction would 
operate as a tariff (because it encourages residents 
to invest at home) and would under the logic in 
Wynne be unconstitutional — even though to hold 
such a tax reduction unconstitutionally 
discriminatory would cause the Wynne majority 
to “recoil.”6
Such a bizarre result, however, is neither 
implied nor compelled by Wynne, which dictates 
the opposite result. An across-the-board rate 
reduction would not fail the internal consistency 
test. If, for example, Maryland reduced its 
personal income tax rate from 5 percent to 4 
percent, then, applying the internal consistency 
test, all other states also would be assumed to tax 
personal income at 4 percent. Assuming 
Maryland either (1) taxed only in-state income or 
(2) taxed the in-state income of nonresidents and 
the worldwide income of residents and offered 
residents a full credit (a credit of up to 4 percent) 
for taxes paid to other states, then in-state and 
cross-border income would both be taxed at 4 
percent, and hence the Maryland tax would be 
internally consistent.
Such a tax would not be discriminatory 
because it would not discourage cross-border 
commerce relative to in-state commerce. The 
hypothetical Maryland tax change would 
encourage both residents and nonresidents to earn 
income in Maryland. In contrast, a discriminatory 
Maryland tax would simultaneously both 
encourage Maryland residents to earn income in 
Maryland and discourage Maryland nonresidents 
from earning income in Maryland. It is the 
simultaneous occurrence of those two opposing 
effects on residents and nonresidents that is the 
tarifflike impact that the internal consistency test 
ferrets out, and that is at the heart of a 
discrimination claim. Those opposing effects 
occurred in Wynne; they occurred in Tamagni;7 but 
they do not occur in Zelinsky’s hypothetical.8
As for Zelinsky’s claim that Supreme Court 
precedent would make it difficult for the Court to 
strike down New York’s residence rule, neither 
Worcester Country Trust nor Cory v. White, the cases 
Zelinsky cited as “standing in the way” of 
applying Wynne to New York’s tax residence rule, 
involved the dormant commerce clause.9 Both 
involved executors’ unsuccessful attempts to 
invoke the Federal Interpleader Act to dispose of 
two states’ potentially conflicting claims of 
domicile over the same decedent.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the 
11th Amendment barred the Court from 
preventing the state courts from coming to their 
own determinations as to the domicile status of 
the decedents, even though those determinations 
might conflict with each other. According to 
Worcester County, the executor’s argument 
demanding interpleader “confuse[d] the 
possibility of conflict of decisions of the courts of 
the two states, which the Constitution does not 
forestall, with other types of action by state 
officers which, because it passes beyond the limits 
of a lawful authority, is within the reach of the 
federal judicial power, notwithstanding the 
Eleventh Amendment.”10 The Worcester County 
Court observed that neither due process nor full 
4
Knoll and Mason, “New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence 
Rule,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 14, 2017, p. 707.
5
New York law allows for tax residence both by domicile and by a 
statutory residence test that looks to physical presence and maintenance 
of an abode in New York. For both types of residents, New York taxes all 
their intangibles income without any double tax relief. If all states 
applied New York’s rules, dual residents would be taxed on their 
intangibles income by both of their tax residence states without any 
credits or apportionment to relieve the overlap. Id.
6
Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 683-684.
7
Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 673 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1998), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 931 (1998) (holding that New York’s residence rule 
did not violate the dormant commerce clause).
8
For the same reason, Zelinsky’s other example of putative 
discrimination — direct expenditures (including those for job training or 
improved roads) — also do not necessarily involve discrimination in the 
dormant commerce clause sense.
9
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 298 (1937); and Cory 
v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
10
Worcester County Trust, 302 U.S. at 292, 298.
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faith and credit require state courts to come to 
uniform decisions regarding domicile. The 
Worcester County Court specifically noted that 
“the present suit is not founded on the asserted 
unconstitutionality of any state statute and the 
consequent want of lawful authority for official 
action taken under it.”11
Similarly, although the Supreme Court in Cory 
v. White noted that “inconsistent determinations 
by the courts of two States as to the domicile of a 
taxpayer did not raise a substantial federal 
constitutional question,” this analysis went to the 
appropriateness of federal judicial intervention to 
prevent conflicting state determinations 
regarding domicile.12 Neither case involved a 
dormant commerce clause challenge of a state’s 
tax residence rules.
Because the 11th Amendment would have 
barred the state courts from taking 
unconstitutional actions, however, Worcester 
County is cited for the more general proposition 
that there is no constitutional bar to double 
domicile. As Zelinsky acknowledges, that view 
has been subject to criticism from members of the 
Court.13
More importantly, it is not the holding of 
Wynne, or our contention, that dual domicile is 
necessarily unconstitutional. Thus, in full 
agreement with Zelinsky, we would not advocate 
for courts to simply pick a winner in the domicile 
contest. Thus, when Zelinsky points out that 
courts have upheld dual residence cases against 
constitutional challenges in the past, our response 
is that they may still do so in the future. That is 
because, even after Wynne, the dormant 
commerce clause does not per se forbid double 
taxation, and by implication, it does not per se 
forbid dual tax residence.
States’ definitions of tax residence may differ, 
resulting in dual residence and even unrelieved 
double taxation. The Constitution imposes no 
requirement that states use uniform tax residence 
rules. To satisfy the Constitution, however, a 
state’s tax residence rule must be internally 
consistent, such that if every state applied it, 
double taxation would not inevitably arise.14 
Although Worcester Country Trust is silent on the 
matter, under the laws of both states in Cory v. 
White, a person could be domiciled in only one 
state at a time.15 Because each state had a statutory 
scheme that, if adopted by all the states, would 
assign a person to only one state at a time, each 
state’s domicile rule (whatever it was) was 
internally consistent because neither would lead 
to double taxation if adopted by all the states.
In contrast, as we showed in our earlier article, 
New York’s tax residence regime is internally 
inconsistent.16 If every state applied rules identical 
to New York’s, double taxation of people with 
cross-border economic activities would inevitably 
result. Thus, Worcester County Trust and Cory v. 
White dealt with issues that are different from the 
dormant commerce clause issue we raised 
regarding New York’s tax residence rules.
Zelinsky would prefer Congress to step in to 
referee dual tax residence disputes among the 
states. He’s probably right that federal legislation 
would lead to more rational and predictable 
results. But, until then, the dormant commerce 
clause safeguards our common market from 
states that would seek to take more than their 
11
Worcester County Trust, 302 at 300.
12
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 89. The three dissenting justices in Cory 
worried that the majority was raising the bar for federal adjudication too 
high. Id. at 94 (“The Court must rely on a double contingency: first, that 
both States might win judgments in their own courts that Hughes was a 
domiciliary subject to estate taxation; and second, that in such a case the 
Hughes estate might not be large enough to satisfy both claims.”) 
(emphasis in original).
13
In his concurrence in Cory v. White, Justice Brennan noted that 
“later cases, construing the Due Process Clause, have undermined 
Worcester County’s holding that the unfairness of double taxation on the 
basis of conflicting determinations of domicile does not rise to 
constitutional dimensions.” Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). Id. (“And Justice POWELL is surely correct in observing that 
‘[t]he threat of multiple taxation based solely on domicile simply is 
incompatible with the structural principles of a federal system 
recognizing as ‘fundamental’ a constitutional right to travel’”) (quoting 
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939)). See also id. 
(Powell, Marshall, and Stevens, dissenting) (“Rigidly applying an aged 
and indefensible precedent, the Court denies the administrator and heirs 
of an estate any federal forum in which to resolve incompatible claims of 
domicile.”). Id. (“The premise, accepted by Worcester County, that 
multiple taxation on the basis of domicile does not offend the 
Constitution — even in a case in which both of the taxing States concede 
that a person may have but one domicile . . . [i]n my view . . . is wrong. I 
now would be prepared to overrule Worcester County on this point and to 
hold that multiple taxation on the basis of domicile — at least insofar as 
‘domicile’ is treated as indivisible, so that a person can be the 
domiciliary of but one State — is incompatible with the structure of our 
federal system.”). See id. at 97 (arguing that “multiple taxation based on 
domicile is prohibited by the Due Process Clause”).
14
Cf. Wynne (approving the internal inconsistency as a test for 
dormant commerce clause violations).
15
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 86 (“Under the laws of Texas and 
California, an individual has but one domicile at any time.”).
16
See discussion, supra note 7.
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share from interstate commerce. In setting the 
limits of the dormant commerce clause, the 
Supreme Court has struck a careful balance 
between promoting interstate commerce and state 
tax sovereignty.
Zelinsky argues that if dual domicile cases 
must be resolved by the courts rather than 
through the legislature, then the right solution is 
apportionment. Although we suggested an 
internally consistent apportionment rule as one 
way for New York to resolve the constitutional 
infirmity in its tax residence rule, in our view the 
states, not the courts, are entitled to choose such 
features of their tax laws, provided they do not 
violate the Constitution.
We would note, however, that Zelinsky draws 
a false dichotomy between dormant commerce 
clause apportionment rules and dormant 
commerce clause nondiscrimination rules.17 The 
principle embedded in the dormant commerce 
clause is that the states must not impose tarifflike 
taxes that distort competition between taxpayers 
on the basis of their state of residence or 
engagement in cross-border economic activity. 
That requirement applies to all tax rules, 
including apportionment rules. 
17
Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 685 (“If the problem [of dual tax residence] 
is to be addressed judicially, the dormant commerce clause concept of 
apportionment provides a more convincing approach . . . than does the 
unsatisfactory notion of dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination.”).
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